C6Awazon Market // record C6

C6 // One machine to a gateway and a workstation

The strongest technical arrangement documented here, and the one most often installed by people whose actual problem was in the address group.

Awazon Market // onion addresses

The three strings below open the same market. The same account, the same balance, the same open orders sit behind each one. Copy a string, paste it into Tor Browser, and read the last six characters in the address bar before you type a password.

awazonozc4jwyrveu4473igv5ldt2hnccl2s7lerm2z27cvrc22e4uyd.onion
awazonth6ocz5cyos63czmhtsglqr7ydkdcc4lopux7nxbauoo2qmvyd.onion
awazonvaqbgkhirejon6qnlxcjibrhkqhzh2xb2lclc6t67vxhlvjkyd.onion

NOTHING HERE IS RANKED. THE ORDER IS THE ORDER THEY WERE WRITTEN IN.

Baseline

One system running both your applications and your Tor client.

Substitution

Two virtual machines. A gateway that runs Tor and touches the network, and a workstation that has no other route out.

What moves

The workstation cannot discover your real address even if something on it is compromised, because it has never been able to see one. Leaks that go around Tor stop being possible rather than being unlikely.

Does not move

The circuit itself, the market, the addresses, and the correctness of the string you paste into the workstation browser.

Cost

Real setup effort, a machine with enough memory to run two systems, ongoing updates for both, and a permanently more complicated session.

Verdict

Only if your threat model includes the workstation being compromised. For most readers that is a larger claim than the situation supports.

IWhat the split prevents

On a single machine, everything shares one network stack. A tool that ignores the proxy, an application that resolves a name directly, or a piece of malware that opens its own connection all reach the internet as you. This is not exotic; the ordinary version is a misconfigured client leaking a name lookup, which is enough on its own.

The gateway model removes the possibility rather than reducing it. The workstation has one route out and that route is Tor. Software running there cannot see your address, so it cannot report it, regardless of intent or of a bug in the browser.

IIWhonix against Tails

Property	Tails	Whonix
Leaves traces on the machine	No	Yes, it is installed
Leak proof by architecture	Yes	Yes
Survives a compromise of the browser	Partly	Yes, the address is not present to leak
Effort to start a session	Reboot	Start two machines
Keeps your setup between sessions	Only with persistence	Yes, naturally

IIIWho this is actually for

The honest answer is: people whose plausible worst case is a compromised workstation, and who can say why that is plausible for them. Somebody who opens files sent by strangers, or runs unusual software alongside the session, has a case. Somebody who reads a catalogue and places an order does not have the same one, and the effort spent here would be better spent on the two manual checks in the address group.

IVThe failure mode of installing it anyway

A setup this involved produces a strong sense of having solved the problem. That sense is spent later on the decisions the architecture cannot reach: a link from a chat, a password reused from another site, a transfer sent while annoyed. The pattern is described in the method and it is the reason several verdicts on this site are stricter than the technology alone would suggest.

IN ONE LINE

It makes a leak architecturally impossible. It has no opinion about the fifty six characters you typed into it.